CEG Orbit Report

AuthorityDepartment for Enterprise
Date received2022-07-11
OutcomeAll information sent
Outcome date2022-07-22
Case ID2529037

Summary

The Department for Enterprise disclosed the full preliminary casualty investigation report regarding the grounding of the cargo vessel CEG Orbit off the Isle of Man coast in August 2021. The document details the sequence of events, including the Chief Officer leaving the bridge due to illness, which led to the vessel running aground during a spring tide.

Key Facts

  • The CEG Orbit, a Latvian-registered general cargo vessel, ran aground on the East coast of the Isle of Man near Cranstal.
  • The incident occurred at 02:15 BST on 26 August 2021 while the vessel was en route from Liverpool to Belfast.
  • The grounding happened because the Chief Officer left the bridge to use the toilet due to sudden intestinal pain, leaving the vessel without a lookout.
  • The vessel grounded during a spring tide at its maximum height, making refloating difficult.
  • No injuries or pollution were reported, and a preliminary hull inspection found no leaks or breaches.

Data Disclosed

  • 26th August 2021
  • 02:15hrs
  • 054.23,52N 004.21,70W
  • 64.2m LOA
  • 1260t DWT
  • 1150mt
  • 3.45m
  • 10kts
  • 9.0m
  • 9.4metres
  • 02.22hrs
  • 14:26hrs

Original Request

Records of IOM Ship Registry Report into the CEG Orbit.

Data Tables (1)

Full Response Text

Isle of Man Ship Registry

Casualty Investigation Report No. CA Preliminary CEG Orbit Grounding on the 26th August 2021

Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 2

Statement of Intent Extract from The Isle of Man Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2001 – Regulation 4: “The fundamental purpose of investigating a casualty, an accident, or an incident under these Regulations is to determine its circumstances and the causes with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame”

Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 3 Contents

Statement of Intent .......................................................................................... 2 Summary ......................................................................................................... 4 Narrative of events ........................................................................................... 4 Comment and Analysis .................................................................................... 7 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 12 Recommendations ......................................................................................... 12

Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 4 Summary CEG Orbit is a Latvian registered, 64.2m LOA, 1260t DWT single hold general cargo vessel having a crew compliment of two Navigating officers, one Engineering officer and two ordinary seamen. The vessel departed Gladstone Dock Liverpool at 16:20hrs on 25th August bound for Belfast, loaded to her maximum draught of 3.45m with 1150mt of wheat grain. Whilst on voyage and proceeding at approximately 10kts she ran aground on the East coast of the Isle of Man near Cranstal at position 054.23,52N 004.21,70W at 01.15hrs UTC (02.15 British Summer Time - BST). Conditions were calm and clear with minimal marine traffic in the area and visibility was good with a 72% waning moon. Narrative of events All following times are BST (UTC +1) 25th August 2021 Vessel loaded 1150mt of wheat grain at Gladstone Dock Liverpool United Kingdom, bound for discharge in Belfast Northern Ireland.
Prior to departure a voyage plan with key information was prepared and signed by all three officers.
At 16.20hrs she departed without a pilot and was navigated through the River Mersey by the vessels Chief Officer under the supervision of The Master. At 18:00hrs and according to the posted watch schedule, the watch was handed over to the Master until 24:00hrs, by reason of good weather, good visibility and working Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) together with a short voyage length, the Master decided the vessel could be solely navigated by the officers without any additional lookouts on the bridge. 26th August 2021 At 00.00hrs, the Master was relieved by the Chief Officer and after handing over the watch/appraising the Chief Officer of the navigational situation, he retired to his cabin to rest. The Engineer Officer was also on the bridge at midnight to ask the time of approach to Belfast before retiring to his cabin to rest. At about 02.00hrs the Chief Officer felt a sharp pain in his intestines and he had an urgent need to leave the bridge to go to the toilet located one deck below.
Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 5 At 02.15hrs the vessel ran aground on the East Coast of The Isle of Man near Cranstal at position 054.23,52N 004.21,70W when the “spring tide” was near its maximum 9.0m height. The Engineer Officer who had been resting in his cabin was awoken by the hull vibrations caused by the grounding, assuming engine or gearbox problems the engineer ran to the engine-room to investigate.
He didn’t find anything obvious but noted that the main engine had slowed down so he went to the bridge to find out what had happened. The Chief Officer ordered the Engineer Officer to wake up the Master which he did immediately. Together with the Master the Engineer Officer returned to the bridge to see the vessel was aground and remembered the time at around 02.20hrs. The “spring tide” maximum height on 26th August was 9.4metres at 02.22hrs, therefore would be slack (very little associated current) and the vessel ran aground at the worst possible time to try and re-float off the sloping sand and rock beach. In the early morning of 26th August (time not indicated) both Ordinary Seamen were woken by the Chief Officer and they saw that the vessel was aground. At 06:00hrs the local authorities and owners were notified of the grounding and that there were no injuries appeared to be no pollution. At 11:00hrs the author attended the vessel on the rising tide to do a preliminary hull inspection in order to check for leaks and/or breaches of the hull. It was possible to see under the vessel due to how the vessel was sat on the sand and no leaks and or breaches of the hull were detected. It was also observed that all three of her anchors were stowed. As the next high tide approached (14:26hrs) and because the bubbler ballast level indicator system wasn’t working and there were no sounding pipes to take manual soundings, the vessel checked ballast tank condition by drawing ballast suction from each tank in succession, all indications were that the hull had not been breached. At 14:47hrs the first attempt to re-float the vessel took place at high tide (8.8m), a local tug the Wendy Ann attempted to assist removing the vessel however this attempt failed. Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 6 27th August
A second attempt was made at high tide (9.1m/02:42hrs) with the assistance of two tugs (Wendy Ann and the CT Vector from Liverpool), this was a success and the vessel was afloat again by 03.00hrs. After testing the engines and steering gear the CEG Orbit made way under her own power to Douglas harbour where further inspection by Harbour Authority divers, a surveyor from Bureau Veritas (the vessels class society) and the author took place to determine that her condition was safe to proceed to sea. Dive inspection revealed minor propeller damage on two blades, a localised deformation of the starboard aft bilge keel, scraping and a few indentations from rocks to the bottom but no hull breaches or cracked welds, the presence of undisturbed hard marine growth on the rudder would indicate it did not contact anything solid.
In addition to the underwater and accessible internal hull inspection, the main engine, steering, fire pump and BNWAS were tested under the supervision of the author and in the presence of the BV surveyor.
This work was completed by 19.30hrs 27th August and the vessel was declared safe to put to sea, with a condition of class applied to have the vessels internal structure examined following discharge of her cargo in Belfast. Douglas Harbour Authority were advised accordingly, however the vessel remained in Douglas harbour until 08.00hrs on 29th August before continuing her voyage to Belfast where she was due to discharge her cargo.
A Bureau Veritas surveyor was not available for internal structure inspection in Belfast so the condition of class has been extended to her next port (Swansea) where inspection will occur prior to loading taking place. Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 7 Comment and Analysis  Loading of the vessel to her deepest load draft in Liverpool was uneventful  Departure Liverpool without a pilot and initial passage was uneventful  Posted watch-keeping schedules were observed from 18:00 with the master taking 18:00 – 24:00 and the Chief Officer the 00:00 – 06:00 watch were followed.
 The engineer observed UMS watch-keeping 08:00~12:00, 13:00~ 17:00 on duty and 17:00~08:00 resting but on call.  Conditions were calm and clear with 73% waning moon (fairly bright), because there was little traffic in the area and the bridge watch-keeper alarm system was working the Master decided that a second watch- keeper was not required on the bridge.  The two ordinary seamen observe watch-keeping hours with either the Master or Chief Officer as required and at the time of the incident were in their cabins resting.  A planned course change from bearing 327.1 to 352.2 is shown on the voyage plan and is marked on the chart and should be known to all three officers (since they took responsibility by signing the voyage plan).  A position marked on the chart at 02:00hrs put the vessel to the right of her intended track.  The Chief Officer - due to sudden intestinal pain, left the bridge completely unattended to go to the toilet one deck below the bridge at some time between 02:00 when the chart was marked and 02:15 when the vessel was running aground and the BNWAS declared as sounding. Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 8  Extract from the Master’s standing orders with a clear statement that the bridge must never be left unattended and should it be necessary to leave the bridge during watch you must first be relieved by another  Officer or by the Master himself.

 Extract from the Company Safety Management System which indicates Masters standing orders have to be followed and actions as considered necessary to avoid any risk have to be taken by the Navigating Officer

 The Master or the Engineer Officer, were not called to the bridge whilst the Chief Officer went to the toilet.  The vessel’s heading was not changed to the new course prior to the Chief Officer going to the toilet, which would have taken CEG Orbit away from a collision course with the shore.  Due to the clear conditions, moonlight and proximity it would be expected the shoreline was visible to night adjusted eyesight.  On the vessel’s track and at the chart position indicated at 02:00hrs The Point of Ayre lighthouse would have been clearly visible. Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 9  Approximately halfway through her intended voyage, the vessel grounded in a position following the 327.1 bearing since the intended course alteration was not made.
 The vessel was proceeding at a speed of approximately 10knts at the time.  The bridge was completely unattended immediately prior to the incident.  Voyage Plan extract (intended course change highlighted)

Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 10  Chart extract showing the vessels position at 02:00hrs BST.

 The engineer was woken by the vibration of the vessel running aground.  The Master had to be woken by the engineer under instruction from the Chief Officer.  The two Ordinary Seamen were woken up in the early morning (actual time not established) by the Chief Officer advising the vessel was aground.  None of the vessel’s three anchors were deployed (indicating there was little warning of imminent danger). Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 11  On the first rising tide following the grounding no apparent pollution or hull breach indications were observed.  If a breach had occurred, the rate and degree of any flooding would not be possible to determine because the bubbler system (a system which determines depth of a liquid in a tank by measuring differential pressure across two sampling points) was inoperative.  On the first high tide – initial attempts to re-float the vessel using one tug (Wendy Ann) were unsuccessful.  Between tides the Harbour Authority engaged a groundwork company to dig around the hull to provide maximum clearance to get the vessel afloat since if the second attempt was unsuccessful the progressively falling tide would mean she stayed until the next spring tides.  On the second attempt using two tugs (Wendy Ann and CT Victor) the vessel was freed and re-floated.  Following engine, steering and communication channel tests the vessel made her way under her own power and berthed at Douglas.  Following the grounding and when the vessel was alongside in Douglas the BNWAS was tested and observed by both the undersigned and BV surveyor to be functioning normally, if left unanswered it sounds a loud and distinctive alarm in both the Master’s and the Chief Officer’s cabins.  The BNWAS is manually turned on and off and can be set for various alarm periods in 3m increments from 3m to 15m  The BNWAS sounds in both the Master’s and Chief Officers cabin’s if left unanswered, yet the Master had to be called to the bridge by the Engineer under instructions from the Chief Officer  The timeout period was not changed to the minimum period such that if nature “took longer than expected” The Master would be called to the bridge by the BNWAS anyway.  As far as could be visually examined under loaded conditions (internal hull access was not possible due to loaded cargo covering the manhole access points), the hull was observed externally and machinery and safety equipment was tested and found to be safe enough to allow the vessel to put to sea.  After resting up and following permission to proceed being obtained from both Douglas Harbour control and Belfast harbour control, the vessel continued her voyage to Northern Ireland to discharge her cargo without further issues. Casualty Report Preliminary “CEG Orbit” “Grounding” Page 12 Conclusions A planned course alteration was not made at the correct time due to the bridge being unattended within the period leading up to the grounding. The Chief Officer failed to follow a direct instruction from the Master by not calling him to the bridge to be temporarily relieved from his key function of safely navigating the vessel. The vessel grounded since it continued to follow its previous heading - which was on a collision course with the Isle of Man. Recommendations The Company Safety Management System instructions and Masters standing orders are very clear, they MUST be followed at all times to ensure the safety of the crew, the vessel and the environment. The Company should perform a root cause analysis of the incident including but not limited to establishing from the crew why company procedures were not followed, why the bridge was left unmanned and take appropriate actions.
The company should circulate the incident to their fleet to raise awareness about a situation that simply should not have happened. The vessel’s flag authority should consider if any further action is necessary.


Freedom of Information Co-ordinator 1st Floor, St Georges Court Upper Church Street, Douglas Isle of Man

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